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Abstract
Most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models
of price formation, and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can
be severely manipulable. In this paper, a bidding model is developed
which has the market-like features that bidders act as price takers and
that prices convey information. Higher equilibrium prices convey more
favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than
do lower prices. Bidders can beneﬁt from trading only if they have a
transactions motive or if they have access to inside information. Apart
from exceptional cases, prices are not fully revealing. A two stage model
is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before
bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing, resolving a
well-known paradox.
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Introduction

Since the introduction in the early 1950’s of the Arrow-Debreu theory of general
equilibrium under conditions of certainty, a large literature has evolved seeking
to extend that theory to accommodate production and trade under uncertainty.
A central feature of the Arrow-Debreu theory is that commodities are identiﬁed by their attributes, including both their physical characteristics and such
factors as the time and place at which the commodity becomes available. To
accommodate uncertainty, Debreu [3] suggested viewing the contingencies (or
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“states of the world”) in which a commodity is deliverable as an attribute, and
Arrow [1] showed how this contingent commodity perspective leads to a theory
of securities as instruments for distributing risk. Radner [24] added an explicit
formulation of the information available to traders in the Arrow-Debreu model.
When each trader is endowed with his own private source of information, or
when traders can acquire information at a cost, the traders’ strategic options
may be drastically diﬀerent than in the case where all information is public. It
may be possible, for example, for a trader to infer information from the terms
of trade he is oﬀered or, more generally, from any observations he makes concerning the behavior of other traders. Some rational expectations equilibrium
(ree) models attempt to capture this process of inference. I argue below that
the existing ree models are defective in important ways, and I oﬀer a partial
alternative which escapes these defects.
For the purposes of this discussion, a state of information is a list X whose
i th entry Xi describes the private information of trader i. A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair of functions mapping states of information into a
price vector and an allocation, respectively, with the properties that: (i) each
trader maximizes his expected utility, subject to his budget constraint, (ii) the
net trades sum to zero, and (iii) each trader’s expectations properly reﬂect both
his private information and any information which can be inferred from the
vector of prices. Traders in these models are assumed to act as price takers in a
new and expanded sense; they believe that their actions will aﬀect neither the
terms of trade nor the informational content of prices.
A recurrent idea in ree models is the idea that prices are fully revealing, i.e.,
that the price vector is a suﬃcient statistic for all of the information observed by
all of the traders. Let di (Xi , p) be the net trade demanded by trader i in some
fully revealing ree when he observes Xi and prices are p. Since prices are fully
revealing, the trader can ignore his private information in forming his demands,
so that di does not actually vary with Xi . (An example of this kind has been
given by Grossman [9] and this point is elaborated by Beja [2]). Let f be the
equilibrium function mapping states of information
 into price vectors. Then,∗
for every state of information X, markets clear:
di (Xi , f [X]) ≡ 0. Let p
be the equilibrium price
vector
corresponding
to
some
state of information X ∗ :

∗
∗
∗ ∗
di (Xi , p ) = 0. But net
p = f (X ). Then
demands∗ do not depend on the
traders’ private information, so for every X,
di (Xi , p ) = 0. In other words,
any price in the range of f clears the markets in every state of information X!1
The problem here arises from the expanded deﬁnition of price taking behav1 This critique is most cogent for models like Grossman’s [9] in which no trader can narrow
the range of possible prices by referring to his private information. For such models, the
equilibrium excess demand functions {di (Xi , p)} may not depend on p. At the opposite
extreme, there are ree models, such as those of Green [8] and Radner [25], in which for
each trader i the range of the equilibrium price function for a given realization xi of Xi (i.e.,
f (X\xi )) is disjoint from the range given any other realization yi . For such models the trader’s
equilibrium excess demand functions are not uniquely speciﬁed and may be chosen to depend
on the private signals. This, however, merely buries the question one layer deeper. What is
the trader to think if the announced price is inconsistent with his private information? The
out-of-equilibrium process is simply not speciﬁed for these models.
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ior. Traders ignore their information because they see it reﬂected in the prices.
But how does private information come to be reﬂected in prices if no trader uses
his information?
In the context of the Arrow-Debreu model, Roberts and Postlewaite [27]
have justiﬁed the standard price taking behavior assumption for large exchange
economies by showing that the incentive to deviate from price taking behavior is
small and that individual traders can have little eﬀect on prices. In the context
of a fully revealing ree, even this standard price taking assumption is hard to
justify.2,3 Following Roberts’ and Postlewaite’s approach, suppose that there
are n traders and that the ﬁrst n − 1 traders adopt their equilibrium behavior,
as described by the net demand functions {di }. Suppose trader n adopts a
demand function d∗n that agrees with dn only at p = p∗ . As argued above,
say more: it is the unique
p∗ is then a market clearing price, but one can 
n−1
∗
market
clearing
price.
Indeed,
at
any
other
price,
i=1 di (Xi , p) + dn (Xn , p) =
n
∗
i=1 di (Xi , p) = 0. Thus, by the appropriate choice of dn , trader n can achieve
any net trade in the range of dn !
Grossman and Stiglitz [11] have called attention to another diﬃculty in the
ree paradigm. If information is costly and prices are fully revealing, and if
the traders believe that they cannot aﬀect the informational content of prices,
then at equilibrium no trader pays to gather information because all of his
information is already freely available to him in the prices. But if no trader
gathers information, then the prices can convey no information. Finally, if
information is suﬃciently cheap and prices convey no information, then some
trader will want to gather information. In short, the system may have no
equilibrium. Grossman and Stiglitz conclude that fully revealing equilibrium
prices are logically impossible, though the root cause of their paradox is probably
the peculiar deﬁnition of price taking behavior. Note that each GrossmanStiglitz trader can clearly see his own private information – information which
is available to nobody else – reﬂected in the prices, yet he believes that he can
have no eﬀect on the prices.
To address seriously such questions as: (i) “How do prices come to reﬂect information?”, (ii) “Are there incentives to deviate from price-taking behavior?”,
and (iii) “How do information gathering decisions aﬀect prices?”, one needs a
theory describing how prices are formed. I have argued above that the ree
paradigm (which is not a theory of price information) does not provide ready
answers to these questions.
One class of price formulation mechanisms which is of great empirical significance and which has recently been the subject of intensive theoretical studies is
2 For the reasons cited in note 1, this argument applies with more force to models like
Grossman’s than to those like Green’s or Radner’s. These latter models make it harder to
specify sensible out-of-equilibrium behavior, and therefore harder to criticize on grounds of
stability and manipulability.
3 Kobayashi [16] has devised a price formation process in which traders, acting as price
takers, grow progressively more sophisticated. A rational expectations equilibrium emerges
after a ﬁnite number of iterations in his model.
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the class of competitive auctions and bidding processes. Many of the papers in
this area study models where the objects being traded are of known quality; only
the preferences of opposing bidders are unknown. In a few models, however, the
objects traded have unknown attributes and the several bidders have unequal
access to information. The equilibria of these models have much the same ﬂavor
as rational expectations equilibria. For example, Wilson [35] and Milgrom [19]
have studied models of a sealed-bid tender auction for a single indivisible object,
with each bidder having only sample information about the object’s value. As
the number of bidders grows large, the winning bid may converge to the true
value of the object, even though no bidder knows that value when the bids are
tendered. Thus, the price (i.e., the winning bid) aggregates information from
many bidders, and the bidders’ equilibrium strategies are deeply inﬂuenced by
this fact.
In this paper, I attempt to strengthen the link between the bidding and
rational expectations literatures. I study a model in which k identical objects
are oﬀered for sale to n bidders (n > k ≥ 1). Sealed bids are tendered, and the
k highest bidders each receive one object for a price equal to the k + 1st highest
bid. This is the “highest rejected bid mechanism,” which was introduced by
Vickrey [32].
Focusing attention on a single bidder i, let Wi be the kth highest bid among
the other bidders. One may think of Wi as the price faced by bidder i. If he
tenders a bid higher than his price, he acquires one object for that price. If he
tenders a lower bid, he acquires nothing.
With this interpretation, each bidder is a “price taker”; he cannot individually aﬀect his price. Although diﬀerent bidders may face diﬀerent prices, all
trades take place at a single price.
Since the bids are submitted simultaneously, bidders must make their bids in
ignorance of the prices. This feature distinguishes the bidding model from ree
models. However, I shall prove that if a bidder were informed of his price and
extracted all of the information which his price conveys, he could never gain by
revising his bid. Thus, the bidders are not only price takers, they also compute
their “demands” as if they had full access to price information.
In the context of this model, one can study a bidder’s incentives for gathering private information. I shall show that a bidder without special private
information and without a transactions motive for bidding can never earn a
positive expected payoﬀ. The best course for such a bidder is to withdraw from
the auction, i.e., to bid zero.
To emphasize this zero-payoﬀ result, an example is given in which prices are
fully revealing, i.e., Wi is a suﬃcient statistic for the information of the bidders
other than i. The zero payoﬀ theorem implies that each bidder has an incentive
to gather information, despite these fully revealing prices. Like the traders
of Grossman and Stiglitz, the bidders in my model assume they cannot aﬀect
prices. However, unlike the traders’ assumptions, the bidders’ assumptions are
fully justiﬁed. Thus, there is no tension in my model between the incentive to
gather information and the informational eﬃciency of prices.
A desirable property of the bidding model is that it captures some of the
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details of real securities markets. In an typical small securities transaction for
a listed security, the buyer places a limit order, i.e., he instructs his broker
to obtain the most favorable possible terms, but not to pay more than some
speciﬁed limit price. (This limit price corresponds to a bid in the model.) He
expects to successfully acquire the security whenever his limit price is higher
than the prevailing price in the market, and he expects that the limit price he
names will not aﬀect the price that he must pay. All of these expectations are
justiﬁed within the bidding model.
This paper is arranged in seven sections, including the present one. In
Section 2, I introduce the ideas of news and good news as tools in modeling
information. Section 3 is devoted to stating the assumptions, developing the
notation, and presenting the equilibrium. Various properties of the equilibrium,
including the zero payoﬀ result, are presented in Section 4. A two stage game in
which traders must choose whether or not to gather costly information before
bidding is analyzed in Section 5. Then, in Section 6, I study some variations
of the basic model. The conclusion expresses my views concerning what can be
learned from the analysis and what remains to be done.

2

News and Good News

Let Z denote the unknown quality of the objects being sold at auction. I take
Z to be a real-valued random variable, with larger values of Z corresponding to
better quality. For example, if the objects sold are mineral rights on adjacent
tracts of land, Z may denote the market value of the recoverable resources. If a
single work of art is being sold, Z = 1 may indicate that the work is an original
while Z = 0 may indicate a copy.
Depending on the particular application, information about Z can come in
various forms, ranging from tables of statistical data to satellite photographs to
consultants’ reports. In general, one can represent bidder i’s information by a
random variable Xi taking values in some abstract measure space. The variable
Xi will convey information as long as it is not independent of Z. Let µi (· | Z)
denote the conditional distribution of Xi given Z.
Whatever form information may take, I shall want to make comparisons
between relatively good news and relatively bad news. Informally, a signal (or
report, or piece of news) x is more favorable than y if for every nondegenerate
prior distribution G on Z the posterior G(· | x) dominates G(· | y) in the sense
of strict ﬁrst order stochastic dominance; and x is equivalent to y if G(· | x) and
G(· | y) are always identical. The variable Xi has the signal ordering property
if for every pair of nonequivalent signals x and y in the range of Xi , either x is
more favorable than y or y is more favorable than x.
There is a standard property of statistical distributions that is closely related
to the signal ordering property. For simplicity, let Y be a real-valued random
variable whose conditional density given some value z of Z is f (· | z). For this
case of variables with densities, the monotone likelihood ratio property can be
found in standard references (e.g., Ferguson [7]).
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Deﬁnition. Y has the (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property if the likelihood ratio function f (y | z)/f (y | z  ) is nonincreasing (decreasing) in y (on its
domain of deﬁnition) whenever z  > z and nondecreasing (increasing) whenever
z.
The general deﬁnitions of the mlrp and of the signal ordering property
require that attention be given to “versions” of densities, a measure-theoretic
detail. (Throughout this paper, I shall always neglect such details.) A rigorous
treatment of these properties has been given by Milgrom [20] and the following
results have been proven.
Theorem 2.1. Y has the strict mlrp if and only if for every nondegenerate
prior distribution G on Z and every y and y  in the range of Y with y > y  ,
G(· | Y = y) dominates G(· | Y = y  ) in the sense of (strict) ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance.
Theorem 2.2. X has the signal ordering property if and only if there exists a
real-valued function h on the range of X such that h(X) is a suﬃcient statistic
for X and has the strict mlrp.
In view of Theorem 2.2, I shall henceforth simply assume that each bidder’s
signal variable Xi is a real-valued random variable with the strict mlrp. Thus,
higher numerically valued signals will represent relatively better news than lower
signals. Theorem 2.1 and the following two results will play important roles in
the subsequent analysis.
Theorem 2.3. Let X have the mlrp and let h : R → R be increasing. Then
h(X) has the mlrp.
Proof: Simply apply Theorem 2.1 to X and h(X).
Theorem 2.4. Let X1 , ..., Xn be random variables which, conditional on Z, are
independent and identically distributed. Suppose that each Xi has the mlrp and
let Y be the kth order statistic among the Xi ’s (1 ≤ k ≤ n). Then Y has the
mlrp.
Proof: I shall treat only the case where the common distribution functions
F (· | z) have given densities f (· | z). Then the density for the k th order statistic
at x is:
n!
F n−k (x | z)f (x | z)(1 − F (x | z))k−1
(k − 1)!(n − k)!

(2.1)

Fix z  and z with z  > z. The likelihood ratio is then
F n−k (x | z) f (x | z) (1 − F (x | z))k−1
F n−k (x | z  ) f (x | z  ) (1 − F (x | z  ))k−1

(2.2)
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The middle ratio of (2.2) is nonincreasing by the mlrp assumption, so the
entire expression is nonincreasing if both F (x | z)/F (x | z  ) and (1 − F (x |
z))/(1 − F (x | z  )) are nonincreasing. Computing a derivative,
f (x | z)F (x | z  ) − f (x | z  )F (x | z)
d F (x | z)
=
dx F (x | z  )
F 2 (x | z  )

(2.3)

which is nonpositive if F (x | z)/F (x | z  ) ≥ f (x | z)/f (x | z  ). By the mlrp,
F (x | z)
=
F (x | z  )
≥



x

−∞
 x
−∞

f (s | z)
f (s | z  )ds/F (x | z  )
f (s | z  )
f (x | z)
f (s | z  )ds/F (x | z  )
f (x | z  )

(2.4)

= f (x | z)/f (x | z  ).
This proves that F (x | z)/F (x | z  ) is nonincreasing. The proof for the other
term is similar.

3

The Model and its Equilibrium

As indicated in the ﬁrst two sections, I shall suppose that there are n bidders
and k identical objects (n > k ≥ 1) and that each bidder observes a real-valued
random variable Xi whose conditional distributions have densities f (· | z) with
the strict mlrp.4 A bidder who receives no object is assumed to earn a payoﬀ
of zero. A bidder who pays b to receive one object earns u(Z, Xi , b).
Earlier studies have focused on two special cases. First, when u(Z, Xi , b) =
Xi − b, this model specializes to the one analyzed by Vickrey. The signal Xi
then represents bidder i’s personal valuation of the objects being sold. For this
case, Vickrey showed that i’s dominant strategy is to tender a bid equal to this
valuation Xi .
The second special case arises when u(Z, Xi , b) = Z − b. The interpretation here is that each bidder would value to object at Z, if only he knew Z.
Wilson [34, 35] used such a model to analyze auctions conducted by the U.S.
Department of the Interior for oil drilling rights. Similar models have been used
by Rothkopf [28], Reece [26], Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber [6],
Milgrom [19], and others.
4 The continuity of F (· | z) and the strictness of the mlrp work together to ensure that
the probability of ties is zero in the equilibrium given in this section. Note 6 indicates how
to compute and evaluate the equilibrium when one assumes only that signals have the mlrp,
without assuming the strict mlrp or continuity of the signal distributions. This extension
is an interesting one because it allows one to apply the model to examples where the signal
distributions (given Z = z) are Poisson (with mean z), geometric (with mean z), or uniform
(on [0, z]).par
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For this analysis, I shall make the following assumptions.
Assumption A1— Symmetry: Each player has identical prior beliefs represented by a distribution G on Z and conditional densities f (· | z) for Xi . The
payoﬀ functions u are identical across players.
Assumption A2— Conditional Independence: Conditional on Z, the signal
variables X1 , . . . , Xn are independent.
Assumption A3— Monotonicity: The payoﬀ function u(Z, Xi , b) is continuous and decreasing in b, nondecreasing in Z and Xi , and strictly increasing in
either Z or Xi .
Assumption A4— Valuable Objects: For all z and x, u(z, x, 0) ≥ 0.
Assumption A5— Valuable Money: For all z and x, there is some b such that
u(z, x, b) < 0.
Assumption A6— Finite Expectations: For all b, E[u(Z, Xi , b)] exists and is
ﬁnite.
Assumption A6 guarantees that all the expectations and conditional expectations used in this paper are ﬁnite. Although Assumption A3 is maintained
through the formal developments, I shall conﬁne interpretive comments to the
case where u is strictly increasing in Z.
The assumptions stated above are general ones by the standards of bidding
models: bidders are allowed to be risk-averse or even risk-loving and preferences
are not required to be additively separable in money. In Section 6, I further
generalize the model by showing that Assumption A2 can be weakened to allow
correlated information without weakening the substantive conclusions obtained
from the model.
The situation described above can be regarded as a Bayesian game, as formalized by Harsanyi [13]. A pure strategy for bidder i is a function pi : R → R+
taking signals into bids. Thus when bidder i observes Xi , he tenders the bid
pi (Xi ).
The bidders’ payoﬀs in the game are determined as follows. Let Wi be the
k th highest bid among the opponents of bidder i. The bid b wins for i if b > Wi .
If b = Wi , the k highest bidders are not uniquely determined, and I assume that
any ties are broken at random. Thus, if b = Wi , b may or may not win. If b
wins (denoted Wi < b), bidder i acquires one object for a price of Wi , so his
payoﬀ is u(Z, Xi , Wi ). If he submits a losing bid, his payoﬀ is zero.
Holding the strategies pj (j = i) ﬁxed, bidder i may regard Wi as a random
variable. His strategy pi is called an optimal response to the opposing strategies
if
pi (x) ∈ arg max E[u(Z, Xi , Wi )1{Wi <b} | Xi = x]
b

(3.1)

for all x in the range of Xi . (The notation “arg max” denotes the set of maximizers of the given expression.) An n-tuple of strategies (p1 , ..., pn ) is an
equilibrium if each strategy is an optimal response to the others.
The analysis of equilibrium in symmetric bidding models is usually guided by
the “educated guess” that there will be a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium,
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that is, one for which p1 = ... = pn ≡ p, and that the equilibrium strategy will
be increasing. With this guess in the background, deﬁne Yi to be the k th order
statistic among the variables {Xj | j = i}. If the guess made above is correct,
then Wi = p(Yi ).
Deﬁne the reservation price function g by:
g(x, y) = sup{b | E[u(Z, Xi , b) | Xi = x, Yi = y] ≥ 0}.

(3.2)

(In view of Assumptions A1 and A3-A6, this deﬁnition is meaningful.) If
bidder i were able to observe Xi = x and Yi = y and if no other information
were available, then he would be willing to pay any price less than g(x, y) to
acquire one object, but he would be unwilling to pay any higher price.
Theorem 3.1. 5 The bidding game has a symmetric equilibrium and the equilibrium strategy is given by the increasing function:
p(x) = g(x, x).

(3.3)

Proof of Theorem 3.1 is postponed to the next section so that a relatively
transparent graphical analysis can be used.
In the special case where u(Z, Xi , b) = Xi − b, it is easy to check that
g(x, x) = x. This is the equilibrium discovered by Vickrey for his model. Vickrey’s equilibrium is actually a dominant strategy equilibrium; a bidder can do no
better than to use his equilibrium strategy regardless of the strategies adopted
by the other bidders.
The second special case arises when u(Z, Xi , b) = Z − b. Then one can check
that the reservation price function takes the following simple form:
g(x, y) = E[Z | Xi = x, Yi = y].

(3.4)

In section 5, an example is given for which the equilibrium strategy is explicitly computed. The computation derives from the following expression, which
in turn derives from (3.4) and Bayes Theorem.

sf (x | s)f (y | s)(1 − F (y | s))k−1 F n−k−1 (y | s)dG(s)
.
g(x, y) = 
f (x | s)f (y | s)(1 − F (y | s))k−1 F n−k−1 (y | s)dG(s)

(3.5)

Before proceeding to study the properties of the equilibrium, let us establish
some properties of the random variable Yi and the functions g and p.
Theorem 3.2. (i) Yi has the mlrp. (ii) g(x, y) is increasing in x and nondecreasing in y. (iii) p is increasing.
5 Equation (3.3) can be informally derived as the ﬁrst order condition of a bidder’s maximization problem if one guesses that there is a symmetric equilibrium with an increasing
equilibrium bid function p. The ﬁrst order condition then asserts that a bidder should be indiﬀerent about whether he is selected as a winner when he is involved in a tie. This derivation
appears in an earlier version of Matthews [18].par
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Proof: That Yi has the mlrp follows directly from Theorem 2.4. Since Xi also
has the mlrp and since Xi and Yi are conditionally independent, an application
of Theorem 2.1 and Assumption A3 establishes that the conditional expectation
E[u(Z, Xi , b) | Xi = x, Yi = y]

(3.6)

is increasing in x, nondecreasing in y, and decreasing and continuous in b.
Then, from (3.2), it is routine to check that g has the properties claimed. Since
p(x) = g(x, x), (iii) follows directly from (ii).

4

Properties of the Equilibrium

The analysis begins with a study of bidder i’s problem when all opposing bidders adopt the strategy p. As shown below, i’s price variable Wi then has the
interesting and plausible property that higher prices convey more favorable news
about Z than do lower prices, in the sense explained in Section 2.
Theorem 4.1. The variable Wi has the mlrp.
Proof: By Theorem 3.2, p is increasing, so
Wi = p(Yi ).

(4.1)

Apply Theorem 2.3.
Theorem 4.1 raises a spectre that I have argued is a problem in rational
expectations models. If bidder i could observe the price variable Wi before
submitting his bid, his estimate of the value of the objects being sold would rise
with Wi . This leaves open the possibility that i’s value estimate would actually
rise as fast or faster than prices do. To see how the bidding model avoids this
diﬃculty, let us analyze the relationship between the price and i’s valuation of
the object given both his private information and the price information. (This
valuation, of course, is a hypothetical one, since i does not actually observe
price information before tendering his bid.) Deﬁne a function ĝ on the product
of the ranges of Xi and p by:
ĝ(x, w) = sup{b | E[u(Z, Xi , b) | Xi = x, Wi = w] ≥ 0}

(4.2)

The functions g, ĝ, and p are related as follows:
g(x, y) = ĝ(x, p(y)).

(4.3)

Theorem 4.2. The function ĝ(x, w) is increasing in x and nondecreasing in
w. Moreover, the following relationships hold:
ĝ(x, w)  w

as

p(x)  w.

(4.4)
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Proof: The monotonicity properties of ĝ follow from those of g via (4.3). For
(4.4), suppose p(x) > w. Then by (4.1) there is some y < x such that p(y) = w.
Hence, using (4.3), ĝ(x, w) = ĝ(x, p(y)) = g(x, y) > g(y, y) = p(y) = w. The
cases for p(x) < w and p(x) = w are similar.

Given a realization x of i’s private signal Xi , the relation between the price
Wi and i’s conditional valuation of the objects is described by the function
ĝ(x, ·) as illustrated in Figure 1. The monotonicity of ĝ(x, ·) is displayed in
the ﬁgure and the relationship (4.4) is represented graphically by the relative
heights of the function and the 45◦ line. For pictorial convenience, the range of
Wi has been represented as a convex set and the function has been shown to be
continuous and strictly increasing. These extra properties are not used in the
arguments given below.
Suppose, hypothetically, that bidder i is given the opportunity to observe
his price Wi before submitting his bid. Suppose that Xi = x and that the price
is Wi = w < p(x). Then it is apparent from Figure 1 that i will be well pleased
with his bid p(x), because the price w is less than his estimated valuation of
the objects ĝ(x, w), and his bid causes him to win an object at that price. If
the price were Wi = w > p(x), bidder i would still be pleased with his bid. In
this case, the price w exceeds his estimated valuation g(x, w ), and the bid p(x)
results in no purchase at this price.6 The same global analysis applies to each
possible realization x of Xi ; so the following result has been proved.7
6 In case of ties (i.e., W = p(x)), the analysis is much more subtle. Suppose, for example,
i
that k = 1, that n ≥ 3, and that the number of bidders with whom i has tied is m (m ≥ 1).
Large values of m indicate that more competitors have received favorable news than do small
values of m. Indeed, conditional on Wi = p(x), the random variable m has the mlrp! Notice,
however, that i’s chance of winning the tiebreaker is 1/(1 + m), so his chance of winning is
highest when the news is least favorable! (Kreps [17] has pointed out a similar problem in
ree models when traders, who compute excess demand correspondences, fail to account for
the information conveyed by the auctioneers’ choice of a point in their demand sets.) My
assumptions sidestep this problem by ensuring that for all x: P {m > 1 | Wi = p(Xi ) = x} =
0.par
7 Theorem 4.3, and, indeed, all the qualitative results of Sections 3-6 can easily be generalized to cover discrete, continuous, and mixed distributions {F (· | z)} with the (not necessarily
strict) mlrp by means of a simple device. Let Xi = (Xi , Ui ) where U1 , ..., Un are randomizing
variables, independent of everything, and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Deﬁne the lexicographic order on 2 by (x, u) > (x , u ) if either x > x or x = x and u > u . Let Yi be
the k th order statistic in {Xj | j = i} using the lexicographic order. Let y be an atom of
Yi . A remarkable fact is this: if u > u then {Yi = (y, u)} is strictly more favorable than
Yi = (y, u )}, despite the fact that the Uj ’s convey no information about Z!
To see why this is so, deﬁne three random variables U−i , m1 , and m2 by: Ŷi = (Yi , U−i ),
m1 = #{X̂j | Xj = Yi , j = i, Uj < U−i }, and m2 = #{Xj | Xj = Yi , j = i, Uj > U−i }.
For any ﬁxed realization of Xi and Yi , larger values of m1 and smaller values of m2 reﬂect
relatively good news, because they indicate that many losers (m1 ) have observed the best
possible news that losers can observe and that few winners (m2 ) have observed the worst
possible news for winners. It is straightforward to check that U−i has the mlrp as a signal
about m1 and as a signal about −m2 ; so, for ﬁxed Yi , large values of U−i represent relatively
good news about Z.par Replacing each of the Xi ’s, Yi ’s, x’s and y’s in Sections 3-6 by Xi , Yi ,
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Theorem 4.3. Suppose that each of i’s competitors adopts the strategy p deﬁned
by (3.3). Then for every possible realization x of Xi and w of Wi
p(x) ∈ arg max E[u(Z, Xi , Wi )1{Wi <b} | Xi = x, Wi = w].
b

Theorem 3.1 can now be proven as a simple corollary of Theorem 4.3.
Proof: By Theorem 4.3, p is the optimal response to the opposing strategies
among all functions of Xi and Wi . Hence, it is optimal among all functions of
Xi alone.
Nothing has yet been said which guarantees that the slope of ĝ(x, ·) is less
than one. It is quite possible that i’s valuation of the object does rise as fast
or faster than the prices in some regions of the graph, as depicted in Figure
1. Theorem 4.3, however, guarantees that i’s underlying “demand curve” is
downward sloping, that is, he would demand one object at any price below p(x)
and no objects at higher prices.
Let us specialize, for the moment, to the case k = 1. Consider the problem faced by an n + 1st trader whose information is garbled compared to that
of trader 1. Formally, this means that the conditional joint distribution of
(Z, X2 , ..., Xn ) given X1 and Xn+1 does not depend on the value of Xn+1 . Let
υ(Z, Xn+1 , b) denote n + 1’s payoﬀ when he acquires an object for price b. As
x̂, and ŷ, respectively, all the results go through (except that some strict inequalities become
weak ones). The eﬀect of the Uj ’s is to cause bidders to randomize in exactly those cases
where ties would otherwise be a problem, and to account for and eliminate the “winner’s
curse” eﬀect described in note 6.par This device of using an auxiliary randomizing variable
and the lexicographic order to give a uniﬁed treatment of discrete, continuous, and mixed
distributions appears to be widely applicable in bidding theory and related areas. For another
application, see Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber [6].par
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with the other bidders, n + 1’s payoﬀ is zero when he acquires nothing. I shall
assume that n + 1 has no transactions motive for trading with bidder 1, that is,
P {u(Z, X1 , ·) ≥ υ(Z, Xn+1 , ·)} ≡ 1.

(4.5)

For example, in the special case u(Z, X1 , b) ≡ υ(Z, Xn+1 , b) ≡ Z − b, condition
(4.5) is satisﬁed: bidder 1 assigns as great a dollar value to the object as does
n + 1 for every possible quality level Z, and he is not more risk averse than
n + 1.
Suppose the n bidders adopt the strategy p while bidder n+1 observes Xn+1
and then tenders a bid of b. This bid wins in two important cases: the case
p(X1 ) < W1 < b and the case W1 < p(X1 ) ≤ b. (The events {W1 = b} and
{W1 = p(X1 )} are null so the corresponding cases can be ignored.) Figure 2
shows that in each case, bidder n + 1 will be unhappy with his bid.
Suppose, hypothetically, that bidder n + 1 is informed of X1 and W1 in addition to Xn+1 . Then by (4.5) and the garbling assumption, n + 1’s reservation
price will be bounded above by ĝ(X1 , W1 ). The case W1 < p(X1 ) ≤ b is represented on the ﬁgure by W1 = w and X1 = x. In this case, the price facing
bidder n + 1 is p(x1 ), which is larger than ĝ(x, w), which in turn bounds n + 1’s
reservation price. Consequently, bidder n + 1 will regret his winning bid of b
in this case. Similarly, the case p(X1 ) < W1 < b is represented on the ﬁgure
by W1 = w and X1 = x. Once again, the price faced by n + 1 (in this case,
w ) exceeds the bound ĝ(x, w ) on his reservation price. So n + 1 always regrets
making a winning bid when he is told X1 and W1 .
The foregoing argument can be generalized to the case of k objects under
the following conditions.
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(4.6)

given Xi and Xn+1 does not depend on the value of Xn+1 .

For 1 ≤ i ≤ k and for all b, P {u(Z, Xi , b) ≥ υ(Z, Xn+1 , b)} = 1.

(4.7)

Condition (4.6) is the “garbling” condition and (4.7) is the “no transactions
motive” condition.
Let i∗ denote the least optimistic individual among bidders 1 through k:
Xi∗ = min(X1 , ..., Xk ). Bidder n + 1 can win one of the k objects only by
bidding more than the better informed bidder i∗ , and hence paying more than
i∗ would be willing to pay. I show in the Appendix that if n + 1 were told the
values of Xn+1 , Xi∗ , i∗ and Wi∗ , he could still do no better than to bid zero and
guarantee a payoﬀ of zero. The conclusions reached above can be summarized
as follows.
Theorem 4.4. Let W denote the kth highest bid among bidders 1, ..., n and
assume that (4.6) and (4.7) hold. Then for all possible values x of Xn+1 ,
sup E[υ(Z, Xn+1 , W )1{W <b} | Xn+1 = x] = 0.
b

The Vickrey auction studied here has the same sort of limiting properties
for large n as was demonstrated for the “ﬁrst-price” auction by Wilson and
Milgrom. Let W n be the k + 1st highest bid in the auction with n bidders.
Deﬁne the value V n of the objects by
V n (Z, X) = sup(sup{b | u(Z, Xi , b) ≥ 0}).

(4.8)

i≤n

The inner supremum represents bidder i’s reservation price on the assumption
that he has perfect information about Z. Thus, V n is the most that any bidder
would be willing to pay under perfect information.
Theorem 4.5. Let the number of objects k be ﬁxed. Then |V n − W n | converges
to zero in probability as n → ∞ if and only if for each two possible values z 
and z of Z with z  > z,
inf
x

f (x | z)
= 0.
f (x | z  )

(4.9)

Theorem 4.5 can be proved by a variation of the argument given in Milgrom
[19]. The theorem indicates that prices may give a good approximation of value
when n is large.
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A Revealing Example

The price formed by the Vickrey auction is not, in general, a fully revealing
price. To see this, one need only recognize that the price is simply an order
statistic from a certain set of random variables, and order statistics can be
suﬃcient only under very restrictive distributional assumptions. Nevertheless,
to emphasize that the Grossman-Stiglitz information acquisition paradox arises
from their price-taking behavior assumption rather than from the fully revealing
prices, it is useful to study a special example of the Vickrey auction model for
which the price is “fully revealing.”
Suppose that there is only one object being sold, that is, k = 1. Let
u(Z, Xi , b) = Z − b, so that the object being sold is worth Z to each and every
bidder. However, no bidder knows the value of Z. Suppose that the conditional
distribution of each Xi given Z is uniform on [0, Z]:

1/z for 0 ≤ x < z,
f (x | z) =
(5.1)
0
otherwise
Finally, suppose that the prior G for Z

 0
s/M
G(s) =

1

is uniform on [0, M ]:
for s ≤ 0,
for 0 ≤ s ≤ M,
for M ≤ s

(5.2)

Using (3.3) and (3.5), the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy pn for an
n bidder auction can be computed:

 ln(M/x)
if n = 2,
x−1 −M −1
n
(5.3)
p (x) =
2−n
2−n
 (n−1)(x1−n −M 1−n ) if n > 2
(n−2)(x

−M

)

As always, the equilibrium strategy is an increasing function. However in this
case, the variable Yi is a suﬃcient statistic for the variables {Xj | j = i}, so the
price variable Wi = pn (Yi ) is also a suﬃcient statistic. Thus, the price Wi reveals
all of the information held by i’s competitors. Unlike the fully revealing prices
in previous rational expectations models, Wi does not also reveal i’s private
information.
Using (5.1)-(5.3), one can compute the expected proﬁt π(n) of an individual
bidder in an n bidder auction (n ≥ 2).
Now instead of assuming that each bidder freely observes his own private
information before taking any discretionary action, let us suppose that the game
proceeds in two stages. At the ﬁrst stage, each bidder must choose whether or
not to observe his private signal. There is a cost c associated with making the
observation. Then each bidder is told the number of bidders m who have made
an observation. At the second stage, each informed bidder i makes a bid which
may depend on m and Xi and each uninformed bidder makes a bid which may
depend only on m.
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Table I
Second Stage Equilibrium Bids
Is i informed? Signal Number Informed
Bid
No.
N/A
0
E[Z]
No.
N/A
m≥1
0
Yes.
x
1
E[Z | Xi = x]
Yes.
x
m≥2
pm (x)
A strategy for each bidder consists of a ﬁrst stage decision and a second stage
decision rule. If the bidder chooses to remain uninformed, the second stage rule
speciﬁes a bid as a function of m. If the bidder chooses to become informed,
the rule speciﬁes a bid as a function of both m and the bidder’s private signal.
Let us begin the analysis of this game by studying the case: π(n) > c.
Then there is a symmetric equilibrium in which each bidder chooses to become
informed and adopts the second stage decision rule described in Table I.
To verify that the speciﬁed strategies form an equilibrium consider ﬁrst the
problem faced by a bidder at the second stage, after the number of informed
bidders m has been determined. The optimality of the zero bid by uninformed
bidders when m ≥ 2 is guaranteed by Theorem 4.4. It is straightforward to
check that the remaining speciﬁcations are best responses for all m, so these
strategies leave the second stage sub-game in equilibrium. Notice that when
m = 1 the informed bidder’s expected payoﬀ is E[Z]. Let us therefore deﬁne
π(1) = E[Z].
At the ﬁrst stage, a bidder who remains uninformed can anticipate a payoﬀ
of zero. If he becomes informed, his expected payoﬀ is π(n) − c > 0. Therefore,
all bidders will choose to become informed. The following has been proven.
Theorem 5.1. If π(n) > c, then there is a symmetric equilibrium in which
each bidder chooses to become informed and adopts the second stage decision
rule given in Table I. (The same strategies are in equilibrium when π(n) = c.)
When π(n) < c < π(1), two sorts of equilibria suggest themselves. In the
ﬁrst, let n∗ be the largest integer not exceeding n for which π(n∗ ) ≥ c. Then
there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which bidders 1 through n∗ choose to
become informed while the other bidders remain uninformed. For the second
stage of this equilibrium, all bidders adopt the rule given in Table I.
There is also a symmetric equilibrium in which each bidder randomly decides
whether or not to become informed. To see this, let us deﬁne f : [0, 1] → R as
follows.
f (q) =

n−1

r=0

n−1
r

q r (1 − q)n−1−r π(r + 1).

(5.4)

The number f (q) is the expected second stage payoﬀ to an informed bidder
when each of his competitors chooses to become informed with probability q.
Since f is continuous and since f (0) = π(1) > c > π(n) = f (1), there is some
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q ∗ (0 < q ∗ < 1) for which f (q ∗ ) = c. When each bidder chooses to become
informed with probability q ∗ , the expected payoﬀ from both stages combined is
zero to every bidder.
Theorem 5.2. If π(1) > c > π(n), then there is a symmetric equilibrium in
which each bidder becomes informed at the ﬁrst stage with probability q ∗ and
adopts the second stage decision rule given in Table I.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 is straightforward. For completeness, note that
when c ≥ π(1), there is a symmetric equilibrium in which no bidder becomes
informed and each adopts the second stage strategy given in Table I. Thus,
unlike the Grossman-Stiglitz model, there is no level of c which is inconsistent
with equilibrium, despite the fully revealing prices.

6

Variations of the Basic Model

This section addresses three questions which arise naturally in studying the basic
model. (i) In real auctions, the seller commonly sets a minimum price. Can a
minimum price be easily introduced into this model? (ii) Can the assumption
that bidders observe conditionally independent signals be weakened without
destroying the qualitative results? (iii) Does the model have other equilibria,
in addition to the symmetric equilibrium?
It is, in fact, fairly easy to introduce a seller reservation price into the model,
and the process of doing so gives additional insights into the nature of the
equilibrium. Let r be the minimum price set by the seller (r ≥ 0). If the k + 1th
highest bid is less than r, then all bids exceeding r are declared to be winning
bids, and each winner acquires one object at the price r. Obviously, if p(x) ≥ r
for all possible x, then the minimum price has no eﬀect on the equilibrium.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose there is some x such that p(x) < r. Then the bidding
game has a symmetric equilibrium strategy p∗ given by

p(x) if x ≥ x∗ ;
p∗ (x) =
(6.1)
0
otherwise,
where x∗ is deﬁned by
x∗ = sup {x | E[u(Z, Xi , r) | Xi = x, Yi < x] < 0}

(6.2)

Just as Theorem 3.1 was proved as a corollary of a “no regret” theorem
(Theorem 4.3), the foregoing result is also the corollary to a “no regret” theorem.
Deﬁne i’s price variable Wi∗ by
Wi∗ = max(r, p∗ (Yi )).

(6.3)

Theorem 6.2. Suppose that i’s competitors adopt the strategy p∗ . Then for
every x in the range of Xi and every w in the range of Wi∗
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p∗ (x) ∈ arg max E[u(Z, Xi , Wi∗ )1{Wi <b} | Xi = x, Wi∗ = w].
b

(6.4)

Proof: Replacing Wi by Wi∗ in expression (4.2), one can deﬁne a function
ḡ(x, w) which is analogous to ĝ(x, w). Figure 3 then illustrates i’s optimization
problem for the two possible cases: when he observes a signal x < x∗ and when
he observes a signal x > x∗ . (The case Xi = x∗ is both trivial and null.) In
each case, it is apparent from the kinds of reasoning used before that p∗ (x) and
p∗ (x ) are indeed optimal even if the value of Wi∗ is known.
The zero proﬁt result (Theorem 4.4) can also be proved for this more general
model. The proof follows the lines developed in Section 4.
Let us turn next to the issue of dependent information systems. The independence Assumption A2 was used directly to prove Theorems 2.4 and 3.2.
Both of these theorems can be proved under a variety of assumptions, of which
the following is perhaps the simplest.8
Assumption A2∗ — Exchangeability: Conditional on Z, the random variable
Z ∗ has the mlrp. Conditional on Z ∗ , the variables Z, X1 , ..., Xn are indepen8 If the conditional joint density function f (x , ..., x , z) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
n
1
and symmetric in (x1 , ..., xn ), then another condition which includes Assumption A2* and
which leads to the same theorems is

∂ 2 ln f
∂z∂xi

≥

0,

∂ 2 ln f
∂xi ∂xj

≥

0

for i = j

The ﬁrst diﬀerential condition is equivalent to the mlrp assumption. The second directly generalizes the conditional independence assumption. For details, see Milgrom [19] and Milgrom
and Weber [21]
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dent. Also, conditional on Z ∗ , the variables X1 , ..., Xn are identically distributed
and have the mlrp.
As an example of variables satisfying Assumption A2*, let e0 , ..., en be independent normally distributed random variables. Let e1 , ..., en be identically
distributed, and assume that the ei ’s are independent of Z, so that they represent “pure noise.” Finally, let
Xi = Z + e0 + ei .

(6.5)

Then, conditional on Z, the Xi ’s are dependent due to the common error term
e0 . However, taking Z ∗ = Z + e0 , these Xi ’s satisfy Assumption A2*.
There are two ways to show that Assumption A2* is suﬃcient for this model.
One way is to trace the proofs through from the beginning. Mathematically,
however, a simpler way is to deﬁne a new game which is strategically equivalent
to the old game under Assumption A2*. The new game will satisfy all of the
Assumptions A1-A6, so all the theorems will continue to hold. The trick runs
as follows.
Let Z ∗ play the role of Z in the new game. Conditional on Z ∗ , the signals
are independent, so they satisfy Assumption A2. Replace the utility function u
of the old game by
û(z, x, b) = E[u(Z, x, b) | Z ∗ = z].

(6.6)

It is then routine to check that Assumptions A3-A6 are satisﬁed, so the entire
development goes through.
The third and ﬁnal question to be addressed in this section is the question
of other equilibria. Unfortunately, Vickrey auctions generally have a plethora
of equilibria, many of which are quite pathological. For example, suppose that
n = 2, k = 1, u(Z, Xi , b) = Xi − b, and Xi is distributed on [0,1]. Then the
equilibrium of Theorem 3.1 is p(x) = x, and this is indeed Vickrey’s dominant
strategy equilibrium. Another equilibrium arises when bidder 1 always bids 3,
regardless of x, and bidder 2 always bids 0. The number of implausible equilibria
of this sort is quite large. None of these equilibria, however, is perfect, as deﬁned
by Selten [31], that is, these equilibria crumble if each player assigns some small
probability to the event that his competitor may make a mistake. For example,
in the equilibrium cited above, bidder 1 must fear that 2 will use his dominant
strategy p(x) = x, while 2 has left himself no hope of earning any positive payoﬀ,
even if 1 errs.
Now suppose that the utility functions are u(Z, Xi , b) = Z − b, so that there
may be no dominant strategy equilibrium. Let n = 2 and k = 1, let Z have
some nondegenerate prior distribution, and let the Xi ’s be normally distributed
with mean Z and variance one.
Theorem 6.3. Let h : R → R be any increasing, surjective function. Consider
the strategies given by
p1 (x) = E[Z | X1 = x, X2 = h(x)] and

(6.7a)
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(6.7b)

Then for every possible value x of Xi and w of Wi ,
pi (x) ∈ arg max E (Z − Wi )1{Wi <b} | Xi = x, Wi = w .
b

(6.8)

In particular, (p1 , p2 ) is an equilibrium pair.
Proof: Simply observe that p1 (x) = p2 (h(x)) and apply the standard graphical
argument.
The equilibria of Theorem 6.3 are all perfect equilibria, yet some resemble
rather closely the pathological equilibria discussed above. For example, let
h(x) = x + a. Then as a grows large, 1’s bid will converge to the upper bound of
the distribution of Z while 2’s bid will converge to the lower bound, irrespective
of their signals. Still, I can ﬁnd no completely convincing way to rule out these
strange equilibria.

7

Conclusion

This paper has developed a bidding model with explicit rational expectations
features. The model has several desirable properties which are missing in many
rational expectations models. These are: (i) The bidders act as price takers
because they cannot, in fact, inﬂuence their prices. I argued in the introduction that ree traders can often dramatically inﬂuence the prices they face. (ii)
The prices vary directly with underlying qualities. Higher prices indicate better
quality. (iii) There is no tension between the informational eﬃciency of prices,
the incentive to gather information, and the possibility of reaching an equilibrium. (iv) The process by which prices are formed is made explicit. (v) For
most model speciﬁcations, the price at which trading takes place is not fully
revealing. (vi) All proﬁts earned by the bidders arise either as gains from trade
or as a result of speculation based on good private information. Poorly informed
speculators can only lose.
The bidding model also has two principal shortcomings relative to ree models. First, it is a one-sided market model; the sellers play a purely passive role.
Second, the buyers have very limited options: each can acquire only one of the
objects being sold. Each of these weaknesses needs to be addressed by further
research.
The Vickrey auction model provides a convenient device for relating bidding
theory to ree theory, because the model shares many features (such as price
taking behavior) with the latter theory. However, qualitatively similar features
do emerge from other kinds of bidding models. In models of the discriminatory
auction, for example, where each winner pays a price equal to his own bid, these
prices may aggregate information. Still, there is no tension between information
gathering and informationally eﬃcient prices. For these models, even though

Milgrom

21

Proof of Theorem 4.4

the bidder’s private information is reﬂected in the price he pays, the tension is
broken by the absence of any price taking behavior assumption.
Various other bidding models merit study. The oral auction, for example, is
one which has not been studied when the objects being traded are of uncertain
quality. When the quality of the objects is known, Vickrey argued that the
oral auction is strategically equivalent to the highest rejected bid sealed-tender
auction. However, this equivalence breaks down when quality is uncertain,
because bidders in the oral auction may be able to learn about quality from the
bidding behavior of their competitors.
In studying these and other processes of price formation, it is important
that researchers admit the possibility that the outcome of trading may depend
critically on the nature of the trading process, and that the variety of possible
outcomes may not be representable by any single model.

Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.4
Lemma 1. The conditional distribution of Z given (i∗ , Xi∗ , Wi∗ , Xn+1 ) does not
depend on the value of Xn+1 .
Proof: Since i∗ and Wi∗ are deterministic functions of X1 , ..., Xn , it follows from the garbling condition that the joint distribution of (Z, i∗ , Wi∗ ) given
(Xi , Xn+1 ) does not depend on Xn+1 (for 1 ≤ i ≤ k).
Hence, the conditional distribution of Z given (i∗ , Xi , Wi∗ , Xn+1 ) does not
depend on Xn+1 (by Bayes’ Theorem). In particular, in the event {i∗ = i}, the
conditional distribution of Z given (i∗ = i, Xi∗ , Wi∗ , Xn+1 ) does not depend on
Xn+1 . But the events {i∗ = i} as i varies are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
Now let us deﬁne a function g ∗ by
g ∗ (x, y) = sup{b | E[u(Z, x, b) | Xi∗ = x, Yi∗ = y] ≥ 0}.

(A.1)

Also, deﬁne (analogously to (4.2))
ĝ ∗ (x, w) = sup{b | E[u(Z, x, b) | Xi∗ = x, Wi∗ = w] ≥ 0}.

(A.2)

Then the functions are related by
g ∗ (x, y) = ĝ ∗ (x, p(y)).
The conditional joint density of


(Xi∗ , Yi∗ )

(A.3)

given Z evaluated at (x, y, z) is

k(n − k)f (x | z)f (y | z)(1 − F (x | z))k−1 F n−k−1 (y | z) for y ≤ x,
k(n − k)f (x | z)f (y | z)(1 − F (y | z))k−1 F n−k−1 (y | z) for y ≥ x
(A.4)
Holding x ﬁxed, this density (viewed as a function of y given z) has the mlrp.
Similarly, holding y ﬁxed, the density of x has the mlrp. Thus, by an extended
f (x, y | z) =
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version of Theorem 2.1, posterior beliefs are monotonically increasing in Xi∗
and Yi∗ . This leads to the following result.
Lemma 2. The function g ∗ (x, y) is increasing in x and nondecreasing in y.
The joint density of Xi and Yi (note that the stars have been dropped) is
(n − 1)!
f (x | z)f (y | z)(1 − F (x | z))k−1 F n−k−1 (y | z).
(k − 1)!(n − k − 1)!
(A.5)
Observe that f ∗ (x, x | z) = f (x, x | z)k!(n−k)!/(n−1)! It follows the conditional
distribution of Z given Xi∗ = x and Yi∗ = x is identical to the conditional
distribution given Xi = x and Yi = x. (To prove this, simply apply Bayes
Theorem.) This leads to the next lemma.
f (x, y | z) =

Lemma 3. g ∗ (x, x) ≡ g(x, x).
In view of Lemmas 2 and 3, the proof of Theorem 4.2 can be mimicked to
establish the following result.
Lemma 4. The function ĝ ∗ (x, w) is increasing in x and nondecreasing in w.
Moreover, the following relationships hold:
ĝ ∗ (x, w)  w

as

p(x)  w.

With these four lemmas in hand, Theorem 4.4 is proved as follows. Let b be
any arbitrary nonnegative number. The computation of n + 1’s expected payoﬀ
when he bids b goes as follows.
E[υ(Z, Xn+1 , W )1{w<b} | Xn+1 ]

(A.6)

a

≤ E[u(Z, Xi∗ , W )1{W <b} | Xn+1 ]
b

≤ E[E[u(Z, Xi∗ , W ) | Xn+1 , i∗ , Xi∗ , Wi∗ ]1{W <b} | Xn+1 ]
c

≤ E[E[u(Z, Xi∗ , W ) | i∗ , Xi∗ , Wi∗ ]1{W <b} | Xn+1 ]
d

≤ E[E[u(Z, Xi∗ , W ) | Xi∗ , Wi∗ ]1{W <b} | Xn+1 ]
e

≤ E[E[u(Z, Xi∗ , Wi∗ ) | Xi∗ , Wi∗ ]1{p(Xi∗ )<Wi∗ <b} | Xn+1 ]
+ E[E[u(Z, Xi∗ , p(Xi∗ )) | Xi∗ , Wi∗ ]1{Wi∗ <p(Xi∗ )<b} | Xn+1 ]
f

≤ 0.
Step a follows from (4.7), the “no transactions motive” condition. Step b
is justiﬁed by the properties of conditional expectations. Steps c and d apply
the garbling hypothesis (4.6) and the symmetry assumption A1, respectively.
Step e splits consideration into two cases: the case Wi∗ > p(Xi∗ ) (for which
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W = Wi∗ ) and the case Wi∗ < p(Xi∗ ) (for which W = p(Xi∗ )). The third case
(Wi∗ = p(Xi∗ )) is null and so can be safely omitted (see note 4). By Lemma
4 and the deﬁnition (A.2) of g ∗ , the integrand in e is everywhere nonpositive.
This fact justiﬁes step f.
Hence, it is proved that no bid for player n + 1 earns a positive expected
payoﬀ. Since setting b = 0 earns a nonnegative expected payoﬀ (by (A4)),
Theorem 4.4 is proved.
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